Approximation algorithms for dynamic resource allocation

We consider a problem of allocating limited quantities of M types of resources among N independent activities that evolve over T epochs. In each epoch, we assign to each activity a task which consumes resources, generates utility, and determines the subsequent state of the activity. We study the complexity of, and approximation algorithms for, maximizing average utility.     

Heuristic Solution Methods for the Multilevel Generalized Assignment Problem

The multilevel generalized assignment problem is a problem of assigning agents to tasks where the agents can perform tasks at more than one efficiency level. A profit is associated with each assignment and the objective of the problem is profit maximization. Two heuristic solution methods are presented for the problem. The heuristics are developed from solution methods for the generalized assignment problem. One method uses a regret minimization approach whilst the other method uses a repair approach on a relaxation of the problem. The heuristics are able to solve moderately large instances of the problem rapidly and effectively. Procedures for deriving an upper bound on the solution of the problem are also described. On larger and harder instances of the problem one heuristic is particularly effective.     

我国上市公司资本结构影响因素实证分析

本文选取了可能影响企业资本结构的多个指标变量进行分析 ,利用主成分分析提供的方法将变量综合成彼此互不相关的少数几个主成分。再用主成分 (作为回归自变量 )对企业的 5种资本负债比 (作为回归因变量 )进行多元回归分析 ,得出了影响企业资本结构的主要因素 ,以及这些因素与企业资本结构之间的关系 ,为企业确定资本结构提供参考依据 ,为企业财务决策提供支持。     

Regular population monotonic allocation schemes

The paper introduces a refinement of the notion of population monotonic allocation scheme, called regular population monotonic allocation scheme (regularpmas). This refinement is based on economic situations in which players may have to select new partners from a set of potential players and in which there exist certain capacity constraints. A sufficient condition for the existence of a regularpmas is given. For the class of games with regularpmas, we prove that the core coincides with the Davis and Maschler and the Mas-Colell bargaining sets.     

我国上市公司资本结构决策的实证研究

本在已有资本结构理论研究成果的基础上，对30家沪市上市公司的资本结构进行了实证研究，提出了在我国资本市场环境下优化企业资本结构的对策建议。     

上市公司资本成本面板数据模型与实证分析

本文利用我国上市公司1997至2002年的有关财务数据,建立了我国上市公司资本成本面板数据模型,运用该模型分析了我国上市公司资本成本与财务杠杆、企业规模的关系.结果表明,财务杠杆的提升、企业规模的扩大将使资本成本下降.该结论对我国上市公司优化资本结构、提高企业价值具有一定的参考价值.     

Allocating electricity transmission costs through tracing: a game-theoretic rationale

Tracing is a method of assigning flows in an electricity network to particular generators and loads, assuming perfect mixing at each node. It can be used to assign costs to transmission users. We show that the resulting allocation is equal to the Shapley value of an equivalent co-operative game.     

创业投资与金融体系关系的实证研究

本文实证研究了创业投资产业与金融体系的内在关系,并对目前我国以银行为中心的金融体系下发展创业投资产业提出了一些建议.     

Compensatory transfers in two-player decision problems

This paper presents an axiomatic characterization of a family of solutions to two-player quasi-linear social choice problems. In these problems the players select a single action from a set available to them. They may also transfer money between themselves.The solutions form a one-parameter family, where the parameter is a non-negative number, t.The solutions can be interpreted as follows: Any efficient action can be selected. Based on this action, compute for each player a “best claim for compensation”. A claim for compensation is the difference between the value of an alternative action and the selected efficient action, minus a penalty proportional to the extent to which the alternative action is inefficient. The coefficient of proportionality of this penalty is t. The best claim for compensation for a player is the maximum of this computed claim over all possible alternative actions. The solution, at the parameter value t, is to implement the chosen efficient action and make a monetary transfer equal to the average of these two best claims. The characterization relies on three main axioms. The paper presents and justifies these axioms and compares them to related conditions used in other bargaining contexts. In Nash Bargaining Theory, the axioms analogous to these three are in conflict with each other. In contrast, in the quasi-linear social choice setting of this paper, all three conditions can be satisfied simultaneously.This work was supported by the Division of Research at the Harvard Business School. Thanks are due to the Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics at Yale University for its kind hospitality during the Spring of 2002. I have received helpful advice and comments from Youngsub Chun, Ehud Kalai, Herve Moulin, Al Roth, Ilya Segal, Adam Szeidl, Richard Zeckhauser, and other members of the Theory Seminars at Harvard, MIT, Princeton, Rice and Northwestern.     

基于MPEG-4的视频流式传输系统及动态带宽分配方法

提出了一个基于MPEG 4精细可分级编码技术的视频流式传输系统。介绍了系统中主要模块的作用,并重点研究了速率控制模块。速率控制模块采用了适合视频流式传输的动态带宽分配方法。它可以根据实时的网络通道波动状况来动态调整滑动参数,以适应网络波动和高效地利用网络的有限资源。实验结果表明,动态带宽分配方法在动态带宽波动条件下不仅可以使相邻帧间的视频质量更加平滑,而且可以大大提高解码视频图像的总体质量,也就是说可同时改善解码视频的主客观性能。